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The Effects of Korean
Unification on the US Military
Presence in Northeast Asia
CARL E. HASELDEN, JR.

“The greatest and most fundamental future challenge to the US in the
1
Asia-Pacific region may simply be to maintain a presence.”

T

he Korean peninsula remains one of the last bastions of the Cold War. The
United States has forward deployed approximately 91,500 personnel to the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, in part to deter North Korean aggression or
to provide the initial military response if deterrence fails.2 However, ongoing
diplomatic negotiations between the ROK and North Korea show the potential
for a peaceful reconciliation and eventual reunification of the two nations. While
a unified Korea is not a certainty, a political settlement on unification may be
reached by 2015.3 Korean unification would be a catalyst for a major revision of
the security architecture in Northeast Asia, involving not only Korea and the
United States, but also Japan, China, and Russia.4 One of the principal US concerns is that the perceived regional stability would lead to a call for the withdrawal of US forces based in Northeast Asia. The groundwork needs to be laid
now for maintaining a continued US presence after unification in order to fulfill
our national interests.5
The focus of this article is on the impact of Korean reunification on the
future US military presence in Northeast Asia. The size of US forces in the region
should be based on a number of factors, including our national interests, geography, emerging threats, regional powers, the appropriate command and control
structure, and the capabilities the individual services provide in attaining our
military objectives.
The United States has a vital interest in a secure and stable Northeast
Asia. Between 1950 and 1953, over 26,000 Americans gave their lives in defense
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of the ROK and our national interests.6 In the 50 years since the Korean War, our
national interests in the region have grown. The United States has security alliances with Japan and the ROK and enormous trade and economic interests in
Northeast Asia. The US economy depends on access to these markets. Japan
ranks as the world’s second largest economy, China as the third largest, and the
ROK as the 11th.7 The United States conducts a third of its total trade in the East
Asia-Pacific region.8
The region not only has strong economies, but strong militaries. China,
Russia, and North Korea currently compose three of the five largest militaries
there, while Japan has the most modern military force in Asia.9 China’s and the
two Koreas’ historic distrust of Japan has been placated over the years by the US
military presence in the region, thus enhancing regional stability. As part of the
bilateral US military alliances with the Republic of Korea and Japan, the United
States has provided air and maritime power projection capabilities for those two
nations that might appear provocative if either had developed them on their own.
If the United States withdrew from the region and a power vacuum ensued, the
instability between nations with combined strong economies and militaries
could lead to an arms race having detrimental effects on regional stability and the
global economy.
Without the North Korean threat, however, the US force presence will
have to adjust to meet the new security environment. Forces designed to face a
specific threat will need to be reshaped to face regional contingencies. Taiwan, to
the south, may still be an area of regional tension, but such transnational threats
as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, and infectious diseases will be the most
likely security concerns.10 Transnational threats will pose a greater problem unless Asian nations move forward with a multilateral agenda, rather than the bilateral or unilateral approaches commonly used now.
The US presence will have to be transformed into one that is smaller, is
more expeditionary, has the flexibility to deal with numerous types of small-scale
contingencies, deters other nations from seeking regional hegemony, and is capable of operating in a complex multinational and interagency environment. US
forces will have to progress beyond joint and multinational operations, attaining
increased coordination and action with US embassies and various national and international intelligence agencies, law enforcement personnel, medical facilities,
and economic institutions if they are to defeat these transnational threats.11
Future forces must also be able to overcome the vast distances that separate key areas in the Asia-Pacific region.12 In such a vital region, there are few
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“One of the principal US concerns is that the
perceived regional stability would lead to
a call for the withdrawal of US forces
based in Northeast Asia.”

US bases and little supporting infrastructure in comparison to Europe and Southwest Asia.13 The ability to project air, land, or maritime forces rapidly within the
region requires a continued US force presence exercising operational reach. If
bases become unavailable in the ROK and Japan, Guam will provide the closest
US fixed facility to stage forces.

Korea—After Reunification
A unified Korea would resemble the ROK, rather than the failing state of
North Korea. North Korea’s decades of international isolationism and prioritizing
its military at the expense of economic development stand in stark contrast to the
evolution of the ROK into one of Asia’s and the world’s strongest economies. The
ROK’s military alliance with the United States has provided the nation with the
stability and security necessary to focus its resources on its economy.
The Republic of Korea has not sought military parity with the North
Korean People’s Army (NKPA), but instead has maintained strong and capable
ground forces while relying on the United States in other critical areas.14 The
United States provides the ROK with vital air, naval, command and control, and
surveillance and reconnaissance assets.15 As the perceived threat from the NKPA
has diminished, the ROK military has looked ahead and attempted to develop
military capabilities to reduce its dependence on the United States and to meet future security challenges. The economic crisis of 1997 and the ROK government’s
budget priorities, however, have stymied many of these efforts.16
It is difficult to imagine a well-balanced, unified Korean military capability being developed by 2015 based on the continued NKPA hostile acts, the
ROK’s current economic constraints, and the financial costs that would be incurred with unification. The inherited NKPA’s antiquated and poorly maintained
equipment would not fit within the future Korean security construct and would actually hinder modernization efforts rather than providing an expanded capability.17
Another source of potential liability and instability is the inheritance of
NKPA weapons of mass destruction, possibly including nuclear weapons.18 With
China and Russia both possessing nuclear weapons, a unified Korea would have
to reassure Japan of its nuclear-free intentions in an effort to prevent the Japanese
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from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. With the continued coverage of the
US nuclear umbrella, Korea could forego this threat to regional stability and
maintain its nuclear-free status.
The countries of primary concern to a unified Korea will be China and
Japan. Russia may be viewed as a secondary concern. A unified Korea would not
be a regional power on the level of Japan or China, but its alignment with either of
those countries would shape the regional security architecture. Although the
ROK understands the significance Japan plays in its security today, that significance may diminish when Japan no longer serves as a staging base for US forces
coming to the ROK’s assistance against the NKPA. Korea’s long mutual border,
increased economic and political ties, and historical bond with China may lead to
a stronger relationship with China, rather than Japan.19
A continued US military alliance with the ROK after reunification will
depend on the Korean and US leaders at that time, public opinion in both countries, and the diplomatic challenges of a future defense pact.20 It is difficult to
predict the national mood in either country 12 or 15 years from now. However,
a Korean population confronted with increased urbanization, pollution, and
nationalist sentiment—and no longer facing the NKPA or other perceived
threats—may have to be persuaded of the strategic benefit of maintaining US
forces on the peninsula.
A continued US force presence, albeit smaller, following unification
would promote stability within the region and reduce the possibility of the ROK
leaning toward China or Japan. The United States also would continue to provide
the ROK outward security and stability as it deals with the expected internal financial, social, security, and political issues accompanying reunification. As Korea completes reunification and transforms its military from a ground-centric
force to one having complementary naval and air components, it may assume a
greater role and influence in security issues beyond Northeast Asia.

Japan—The Linchpin of US Security in Asia
In Asia, Japan has the largest defense budget, the most modern forces,
and the greatest economic resources devoted to force improvement.21 Until recently, however, Japan has strictly adhered to its constitutional clause nine that
prohibits it from having “normal” armed forces and allows for only self-defense
forces.22 Japan has relied on the US military to protect its interests and access to
overseas markets, such as the sea lines of communication through the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and the Taiwan Strait. In exchange for regional security and
stability, Japan has granted the United States basing rights in Okinawa and on the
mainland of Japan.23
Domestic and international events, however, continue to pick at the
US-Japan alliance. Japan has been under tremendous domestic pressure to reduce
the US military presence on Okinawa, despite its strategic geographic location.24
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While the Japanese have placed some pressure on the United States with regard to
Okinawa, the United States has responded with its own pressure on Japan. The
United States has pushed for Japan to become a more “normal” nation and assume
a greater role in regional and international security. Five external developments
have created an impetus for Japan to move in this direction:
l The US diplomatic rift with Japan for providing primarily financial
support to the coalition during Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm.
l The NKPA ballistic missile test over Japan in 1998 that demonstrated
Japan’s vulnerability to other countries.
l China’s increased military spending and move to become a regional
power with air and maritime capability.25
l The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, which underscored the significant danger posed by transnational threats.
l The sinking of a suspected North Korean vessel after an exchange of
gunfire with the Japanese Coast Guard in December 2001.26
Any move by Japan toward normalcy would undoubtedly be portrayed
by some in China and Korea as a reemergence of its militaristic past. Because of
Japan’s economic and technological capabilities, it has the capability to transform its military from a self-defense force into one capable of power projection.
This transformation could be accomplished in a relatively short time. Although it
is ultimately up to the Japanese to allay the concerns of their neighbors that Japan
will not repeat its earlier transgressions against them, a continued US presence
on Japan would go a long way in providing needed reassurance.

China—Facilitating Regional Stability or Instability?
The United States views China as the most significant long-term security concern in Northeast Asia. The Bush Administration has categorized China
as “a competitor and a potential rival, but also a trading partner willing to cooperate in the areas, such as Korea, where strategic interests overlap.”27 The Administration states that China is not an enemy, and that its task is to keep China from
becoming one. While the United States views China as having hegemonic aspirations within the region, the Chinese are equally concerned that the United States
is pursuing a strategy of containment against them. China views the United States
and Japan as the only two nations that could cause it major security concerns in
Northeast Asia. However, China’s top security priority appears to be focused internally; it seeks a stable international environment so it might focus on domestic
issues and economic development.28
China has increased its military spending, but as a historically landbased power, it has a long way to go to develop power projection capabilities.
China lacks a blue-water navy, amphibious capability, aerial refueling assets, airborne early warning, and many of the other highly technological systems pos-
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sessed by the United States and Japan.29 At China’s present rate of military
transformation, it would probably be 2020 or later before China could effectively
challenge the United States militarily.
China will be concerned about any US presence on Korea following reunification, especially if US forces are stationed above the 38th parallel.30 While
China does not have a vote on the future US military presence in Northeast Asia,
the intentions of the United States and the ROK on continued US basing need to
contain a degree of transparency in an effort to promote regional stability.31 During the Korean War, China demonstrated its willingness to expend lives and national treasure to protect its interests.

Russia—A Player in Northeast Asia?
Russia’s military capabilities in East Asia have declined significantly in
recent years, but its land border with a unified Korea and its nuclear weapons capability mean it cannot be ignored. Russia’s primary concern in Northeast Asia appears to be maintaining some type of influence over events affecting major policy
decisions.32 While the United States has been guilty of excluding Russia from diplomatic initiatives in the past, it is now seeing benefits in encouraging Russia to
play an active role in the East Asia-Pacific security arena.33
Russia’s influence and its ability to regain parity with China and Japan related to regional security matters depend to a large extent on its ability to deal with its
own economic and political challenges. Until Russia fixes its internal problems,
China and Japan will be the principal influences on the Korean peninsula.34

The Role of US Pacific Command
The former Commander of US Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair,
stated that whatever the future holds, it is in the best interests of the Republic of
Korea and the United States to maintain a US presence on the Korean peninsula.35
Korean and Japanese cooperation, not rivalry, is the key to obtaining long-term
stability in Asia.36 While Admiral Blair viewed North Korea as the biggest threat
in his area of responsibility, he emphasized that Asia’s regional stability also
hinges on China.37
Under Admiral Blair’s leadership, Pacific Command (PACOM) focused
on trying to bring Asian countries to multilateralism while maintaining US bilateral relations. Only regional cooperation can defeat the transnational threats
that pose the major security concerns of today and the future. While Asian nations
have been slow to warm to the idea of multilateralism, the terrorists attacks of 11
September 2001 showed the necessity of nations working together regionally
and globally to combat transnational threats. The 11 September events also
highlighted the need for nations to work together using all elements of national
power, posing the difficult task of coordinating diplomatic, economic, sociopsychological, and military actions to achieve success.
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The future security architecture of Northeast Asia after Korean unification will necessitate a change to the way PACOM is structured. Some of the US
forces currently stationed in Northeast Asia may be shifted to troubled areas in
Southeast or Southwest Asia. Two of PACOM’s sub-unified commands, US
Forces Japan (USFJ) and US Forces Korea (USFK), will also need to adapt to the
evolving security environment. For the purposes of this article, the focus will be
on USFK’s evolution.

US Forces Korea to Northeast Asia Command
In his report to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2001,
General Thomas Schwartz, former Commander of United Nations Command
(UNC)/Combined Forces Command (CFC) and Commander, USFK, stated that
the USFK role in the future will transition to Northeast Asia regional security. Korea’s reunification would do away with two and probably all three command hats
that the United States currently maintains on the peninsula. There would no longer
be a role for the United Nations Command to uphold the terms of the Korean War
Armistice Agreement. The role of the Combined Forces Command during the armistice is to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to defeat an external armed attack
against the ROK.38 Politically, it would be difficult for the ROK and United States
to justify retaining Combined Forces Command without identifying China as a
likely threat to a unified Korea. With USFK being the joint headquarters by which
the United States provides combat forces to Combined Forces Command, USFK
may no longer have a mission if Combined Forces Command is dissolved.
The follow-on organization to USFK and USFJ could be a US Northeast Asia Command (NEAC), a PACOM sub-unified command encompassing
both Korea and Japan, focused on regional threats.39 If so, in order to gain Korean
public support, the headquarters of NEAC should not be in the current UNC/
CFC/USFK headquarters in Seoul; rather, the United States should return the
Yongsan Garrison to the ROK. The United States agreed in 1990 to do so if the
ROK provided an alternate site and funded the move. The relocation talks were
suspended in 1993 due to the perceived financial costs and protests from locals at
the potential new sites.40 The future location for an NEAC headquarters should be
south of the 38th parallel, provide easy access to a major population center, and
be near a major military or civilian airfield.
US forces stationed in Korea as part of an NEAC should remain primarily Army and Air Force, based on the long-term working relationship of these
services with their Korean counterparts and the political sensitivities of introducing new forces. Both of these services would require a restructuring of their component organizations and bases. Within the next decade, a follow-on agreement
should be executed to the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), in which the United
States is returning significant parcels of land to the ROK in an effort to consolidate its bases, prevent encroachment, and improve efficiency in exchange for a
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“Most of the 2d Division could be returned to
the United States, with only one IBCT, or
perhaps two, and the prepositioned
heavy brigade set remaining in Korea.”

few smaller tracts.41 LPP II should include the return of the Yongsan Garrison
and the Koon-ni bombing range in Maehyang-ri, Hwaseong, to the ROK; guarantee US access to ports and airfields for contingency operations; and provide for
further consolidation and reduction of bases as the US force presence is reduced.

US Army
The Army combat presence in Korea is built around the 2d Infantry Division, which is composed of a heavy and light ground maneuver brigade, an aviation brigade, and its organic artillery. Additionally, a prepositioned heavy brigade
set of equipment is stored on the peninsula.42 General Schwartz sought one Interim
Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) to replace one of the existing 2d Division brigades
for both current missions and to complement the other services’ expeditionary capabilities as the focus transitions to Northeast Asia regional security.43 An IBCT is
designed with specific operational and organizational capabilities and would be
able to deploy rapidly and conduct early entry operations.44
Unless there is a perceived ground threat from China, which is viewed
as unlikely, the Army forces stationed in Korea would need to be reduced and
made more expeditionary in design, supporting General Schwartz’s desire for an
IBCT.45 Most of the 2d Division could be returned to the United States, with only
one IBCT, or perhaps two, and the prepositioned heavy brigade set remaining in
Korea.46 US-based Army forces would need to continue training on the peninsula
to gain experience in case a reinforcement capability is required.

US Air Force
With the exception of Guam and Diego Garcia, all permanent US Air
Force bases in Asia are in Japan and the ROK.47 While the bases in Japan and the
ROK are well-suited to counter the NKPA threat, geographic distances make
these bases unsuitable to deal with many of the potential flash points in the East
Asia-Pacific region. A distance of 500 nautical miles (nm) is considered the unrefueled combat radius of current and next-generation fighters, including the
F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. If fighter support were required in Taiwan, US
bases in Korea are 800 nm; Misawa, Japan, 1,400 nm; and Guam 1,500 nm away.
Winter 2002-03
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While these distances do not rule out US Air Force fighter support, they do lead to
more complicated air operations with additional refueling support and reduced
on-station time.48
Reunification would more than likely lead to a call for a reduced US Air
Force presence in Japan and Korea. In Korea, US planners should be prepared for
the potential loss of one of the two main operating bases and the possible movement of squadrons to Guam or back to the United States.49 The base at Kunsan is
farther south and closer to potential points of instability, so its retention may be
preferred over Osan. While it is unlikely there will be the political or military
support required to build additional US bases in the region, the designation and
preparation of bases placed in caretaker status to accept Air Force aircraft in response to a contingency needs to be studied in greater detail.50
The Air Force may be left with only two options. The first is technologybased and requires the development of long-range, high-speed strike aircraft to
minimize the impact of having few land bases. While these aircraft may be specifically designed to support Asia, they would provide flexibility in any region when
nations fail to provide overflight rights.51
The second option is for the Air Force to draft a memorandum with the
Navy that identifies specific roles and functions in response to an East AsiaPacific regional contingency. The Air Force might be designated to provide
long-range bomber support, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and battle management capability, while the Navy would provide carrierbased strike aircraft.52

US Navy
The Asia-Pacific region is a maritime environment, and the ROK and Japan have benefitted significantly from the presence of the US Navy. If the United
States ever had plans to contain China, the US Navy would be a significant part of
any military response.53 While the Navy is slowed by the vast distances in the Pacific, once on-station it can normally remain there for an indefinite period of time
without depending on support from nations in the region.
The Navy’s ability to project power ashore increases the flexibility of
the United States when responding to contingencies. The initial air strikes in Afghanistan highlighted the importance of carrier-based strike aircraft when land
bases are not available to support strike operations. While the US military is not
designed around one geographic area or type of operation, Operation Enduring
Freedom highlighted the importance of retaining aircraft carriers capable of minimizing the lack of access during the conduct of combat operations.54
The other important role for the Navy in Asia is to project land forces
ashore. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report of 2001 established one
of the six critical operational goals of transformation as projecting and sustaining
US forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments and defeating
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“The decision on whether or not the United States
retains bases in the ROK and Japan is ultimately
up to each of those governments.”

anti-access and area-denial threats. It further directed the Secretary of the Navy
to develop new concepts of maritime prepositioning, high-speed lift, and new
amphibious capabilities. However, the QDR did not establish a time-line for
transforming these new concepts into warfighting capabilities and maintained
the baseline Navy at its current configuration of 12 aircraft carriers and amphibious ready groups.

US Marine Corps
As discussed in the section on Japan, the US Marine Corps presence on
the strategically placed island of Okinawa has been a source of friction. Korean
reunification would certainly serve as a catalyst for a significant reduction of
Marines on the island, if the Marine Corps presence is not reduced sooner. General James Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps, has stated that it is clear the
United States will have fewer permanent bases in Asia in the future. General
Jones feels that the people on Okinawa will see how protests and political pressure will force the eventual withdrawal of the US military from Vieques, Puerto
Rico, and “will draw conclusions from that.”55 However, it is not only the people
of Okinawa who may draw these conclusions. On 23 July 2001, a Korea Herald
editorial commented that “one victim in a bombing range located within the US
dominion brought about its closure, while 12 deaths here [referring to the
Koon-ni bombing range] have changed nothing.”56
While the United States has explored various options to minimize Marine presence on the island, a workable long-term solution has not been developed.
The Marine Corps is conducting more training off of Okinawa in other Asian countries, and QDR 2001 tasked the Secretary of the Navy to develop new concepts of
training in littoral warfare in the western Pacific. In the future, the Marines may be
able to retain bases on the island by reducing their size from a Marine Expeditionary Force to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. However, redeploying the Marines
to Hawaii, Guam, or the continental United States without a technological breakthrough in fast-speed sealift would add days and even weeks to their ability to respond. The long-term solution may be, as General Jones describes, “lily pads in the
Pacific,” where the US military has arrangements with a number of countries to
train on their territory for short periods of time and then depart.57
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In Sum
Korean reunification—if it indeed comes about—will change the US
military presence in Northeast Asia, and the United States should begin laying
the groundwork to ensure that this historic event increases regional opportunities
and not challenges. A continued US presence in both the Republic of Korea and
Japan would provide unique capabilities and an ability to respond to regional
contingencies. Such a continued presence would serve as a stabilizing factor during any period of transition. US forces remain in a unified Germany today for
similar reasons, even though the Soviet Union is no longer around to threaten European security.
The decision on whether or not the United States retains bases in the
ROK and Japan is ultimately up to each of those governments. If the decision is
made by either to remove US bases, there is likely to be increased domestic pressure on the other nation to do the same. Neither wants to be the only nation in Asia
allowing foreign forces on its soil.
The island of Guam, due to its small size and distance from the key areas
in Asia, cannot make up for the loss of bases in the ROK and Japan. While the
United States should strive to maintain its essential bases in Northeast Asia, it
should also seek to hedge its position through technological offsets. The QDR
2001 direction to the Secretary of the Navy to develop new concepts of maritime
prepositioning, high-speed lift, and new amphibious capabilities suggests ways
the United States can maintain an expeditionary presence without having to depend on nations to grant access. The US services, especially the Air Force, should
also develop a longer-range, high-speed strike aircraft which will further reduce
dependence on land bases.
Finally, the evolving US force presence will operate in a complex multinational and interagency environment. In order to defeat the transnational
threats to security in the region, the US military must be capable of coordinating
and operating with US embassies and various national and international intelligence agencies, law enforcement personnel, medical facilities, and economic institutions just as easily as it operates within a joint environment today. A small,
capable, and expeditionary joint force will be seen as a complementary capability to the Japanese and Korean militaries and will less likely be construed as a
threat by the Chinese.
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